Update (as of 1/16/26):
After this case note was posted, attorneys representing the tenants filed a motion to reconsider and requested oral argument. The attorney representing the landlord filed a response. The court's ruling could (obviously) change the holding summarized in this article.
Residential unlawful detainer filings (eviction cases) have seen record volume in Washington in recent years. Most residential unlawful detainer actions proceed no further than a statutory show cause hearing.
But what is a show cause hearing? Is it a preliminary injunction hearing? A summary judgment hearing? A hybrid?
What burden must the plaintiff meet to gain possession? To gain other relief? Is it the same burden?
On appeal, is the standard of review de novo, or abuse of discretion?
The answers to these questions were clarified by the recent Court of Appeals decision in Egbert v. Jorgensen.
As Division Two of the Court of Appeals explained in Egbert, the show cause hearing is a two-step process. In this first step, the court considers the right of possession. In the second step, the court considers the right to other relief. In making the observation that the statute requires a two-step process, the Court cited and followed the analysis of the Washington Supreme Court in Faciszewski v. Brown. “[T]he show cause hearing has characteristics of both a preliminary injunction and a summary judgment proceeding.” Faciszewski v. Brown, 187 Wash. 2d 308, 315 n.4 (Wash. 2016).
Step One: Possession.
“[I]f it shall appear that the plaintiff has the right to be restored to possession of the property, the court shall enter an order directing the issuance of a writ of restitution.” RCW 59.18.380. Emphasis added.
As the Court observed in Egbert, “The lens through which the superior court makes a decision on this first step is unencumbered by anything other than whether it appears that the landlord has the right to be restored to possession.” In other words, the “material issue of fact” standard does not apply to the question of possession. This, again, is consistent with the Washington Supreme Court analysis in Faciszewski, analogizing the “[I]f it shall appear” language in RCW 59.18.380 with the “likelihood that the moving party will prevail” test of a preliminary injunction. Faciszewski, n.4.
The court must grant possession if “it shall appear” that the plaintiff is legally entitled to possession. “Otherwise, the issue of possession must be set for trial within 30 days.” Egbert, citing RCW 59.18.380.
Step Two: Other Relief.
“Other relief” refers generally to monetary damages and costs awards. Garrand v. Cornett, ____ Wn.App. ____, 550 P.3d 64, 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024); Eight Is Enough LLC v. Ohlig, No. 85901-3-I (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2024). Webster v. Litz, 18 Wn. App. 2d 248, 252-53, 491 P.3d 171 (2021)(explaining that after obtaining a writ of restitution, “the landlord is entitled to immediate possession of the property pending a final judgment”).
The Court of Appeals observed in Egbert that “the statute imposes a different lens for the superior court’s consideration [of other relief] that is more similar to summary judgment… Unlike step one, for step two, the statute requires that the superior court consider ‘other relief’ with a more defined lens by evaluating whether there are any substantial or genuine issues of material fact that require a trial.”
An important distinction with the “issue of material fact” lens of a summary judgment hearing is that in an unlawful detainer show cause hearing the court is required to take testimony and weigh witness credibility. Leda v. Whisnand, 150 Wn. App. 69, 207 P.3d 468 (2009).
The Court of Appeals expounded on this distinction in Egbert.
“To inform this decision, the superior courts must engage directly with the parties and witnesses (and specifically tenants who may have less access to legal resources or information) and assess the veracity of the various claims. One might readily imagine that this assessment could rise or fall on the subtleties of courtroom dynamics, such as body language, voice inflections, and other nonverbal cues related to credibility. Assessing the veracity of the information, both written and oral, provided by participants under a statutory scheme that values both expediency and efficiency while, at the same time, providing tenants a meaningful right to be heard, asks much of our superior courts at these hearings. A similarly comprehensive assessment is not necessary or even allowed for summary judgment motions. Barker v. Advanced Silicon Materials, LLC, 131 Wn. App. 616, 624, (“On motion for summary judgment the trial court does not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility.”), review denied, 158 Wn.2d 1015 (2006).
In contrast to summary judgment, the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act “expressly directs the court to ‘examine the parties” including witnesses other than the parties “if necessary to ascertain the merits of a defense.” Leda v. Whisnand, 207 P.3d 468 at 475, 150 Wn. App. 69 (Wash. App. 2009).
Thus, only after examining the witnesses and weighing credibility can the court determine whether there are issues of material fact warranting trial as to other relief.
Standard of Review
Division One concluded in Egbert that as to the first step (possession) the standard of review is abuse of discretion. This is a high bar on appeal, as only if “a superior court’s ruling is manifestly unreasonable or is based upon untenable grounds or reasons” will the appellate courts disturb the trial court’s ruling. “A superior court’s decision does not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion simply because the reviewing court might have decided the issue differently—it is an abuse of discretion only if “ ‘no reasonable judge would have reached the same conclusion.’ ” Egbert, citations omitted.
By contrast, “[t]he court does not weigh credibility in deciding a motion for summary judgment. If the facts as presented by the parties would require the court to weigh credibility on any material issue, a genuine issue of fact exists in summary judgment will normally be denied.” Washington Handbook on Civil Procedure. Summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo, meaning that the court on appeal pays no deference to the trial court’s ruling and instead engages in the same analysis as the trial court (thus review is de novo, literally “anew”.)
The tenant in Egbert, naturally urged that a de novo review is the appropriate standard of review, arguing that the superior court is “only supposed to review the evidence and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed.”
In rejecting the de novo standard as to an award of possession at the show cause hearing, the court noted that previous appellate case law conflated the analysis as to possession and the analysis as to other relief.
“We are hesitant to adopt the reasonings of either the Tedford or Kiemle courts. Neither opinion clearly acknowledges the differences in the statute’s language when it discusses the first step, determining the right of possession, and the second step, determining 'other relief.' Instead, both decisions appear to blend the two steps into a single determination. Further, both courts end their analysis after considering only small portions of the language of RCW 59.18.380 without reconciling their position with the unique nature of unlawful detainer procedures and the practical realities of show cause hearings.”
While the Court expressly held that an abuse of discretion standard applies to possession decisions, the Court held the door open as to decisions on other relief. “We do not decide whether an abuse of discretion standard is appropriate for all decisions made at a show cause hearing as this case presents only the singular question of what standard to apply to the first step under RCW 59.18.380—the superior court’s decision regarding a writ of restitution… We leave for another day which standard should be applied to the second step—the superior court decisions made at a show cause hearing about ‘other relief.’”
Conclusions
As there have been many appeals in landlord-tenant law in recent years, the standard of review is of some importance. Still, even in an era of frequent appellate decisions on landlord-tenant law, only a small fraction of cases are appealed.
Unlike appeals, show cause hearings are quite common with many cases (rough gauge: at least a third of cases and perhaps half) reaching that point in the process. Of far more import, therefore, to landlords, tenants, their attorneys, and the Egbert decision’s clarification of the two-step show cause hearing process and the distinction of the court’s inquiries in each step.
